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ASSESSMENT OF AND OUTLOOK ON CHINA’S 
CORRUPTION AND ANTICORRUPTION CAMPAIGNS:  
STAGNATION IN THE AUTHORITARIAN TRAP 
 
SHAOMIN LI1 
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY 
ABSTRACT 
Since the beginning of China’s economic reform in the late 1970s, corruption 
has been progressing alongside of economic growth. In 2012, when Xi Jinping took 
power, he waged the largest and longest anticorruption campaign known in the 
history of the Chinese Communist Party. This study provides an assessment on his 
campaign and projects an outlook on the future of corruption and anticorruption in 
China. The author argues that China will enter into an “authoritarian trap,” in which 
the authoritarian power enables the state to effectively carry out the economic 
reform and achieve economic growth, while suppressing the demand for the rule of 
law and democratization, resulting in rampant corruption that hurts further 
economic development and threatens the authoritarian rule. However, eradicating 
corruption in absence of the rule of law risks returning to Mao’s communism, which 
is not in the best interest of the authoritarian state either. Trapped in this dilemma, 
China will likely experience stagnation in both economic and political development 
in the foreseeable future.  
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BACKGROUND: THE MOST CORRUPT REGIME  
IN CHINA’S HISTORY 
 
In a propaganda movie made in Mao’s era, The Naval Battle of 1894 (Jiawu 
Fengyun (1962) (baidu.com 2014)), the generals of the Qing Dynasty were so 
corrupt that they supplied cheap fake ammunition full of sand instead of gun powder 
to their own battle ships, and thus lost the war with Japan. Ironically, today the 
generals of Mao’s successors are doing much better than their ancestors in gobbling 
up state assets through corruption:  Xu Caihou, the highest ranking general in the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), was accused of selling official positions for 
bribes, and one of his asset managers in Hong Kong managed over HK$10 billion 
(US$1.2 billion) in assets (zh.wikipedia.org 2014). Compared with the corrupt 
officials in today’s China, the corruption of the officials in Qing Dynasty is easily 
dwarfed: the most corrupt official of the Qing Dynasty that we know of, Heshen, 
amassed wealth that, by some estimate, would equal 2 billion RMB (US$320 
million) today, which would be smaller than the bribes received by many mid-level 
officials in today’s China (360doc.com 2014). 
 
In fact it is not surprising that today’s corruption in China is worse than that of 
the Qing Dynasty.  The fundamental reason for official corruption is that the state 
controls too many resources and the officials have too much power to distribute 
them (Chen 2008).  These government controls, such as business licenses, permits, 
public funds, projects, jobs, and properties, do not belong to the officials themselves, 
but they have the power to distribute them, thus they have a strong incentive to dole 
them out to the individuals or firms who can pay big bribes. For example, they can 
sell state assets worth $100 million to a briber for $10 million plus a $1 million 
bribe. In other words, they take a personal gain at the expense of the state. 
 
In the Qing Dynasty, all of China belonged to the emperor and his family for 
the infinite future. Thus the emperor had a long term view and had little incentive 
to take a bribe to under sell the state property, because it was his own. Only the 
officials under him had the incentive to become corrupt, and this is why emperors 
hated corrupt officials and punished them severely. 
 
In today’s China, no one has an infinite claim over China as did the Qing 
emperors. Even the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has 
only a limited term, and he cannot pass his position on to his children. And yet the 
party gives him and his officials nearly unlimited power to distribute state assets to 
anyone they favor. The combination of unlimited power and limited terms, along 
with the vast wealth accumulated during the decades of China’s rapid economic 
growth (We will explain later why China thrives despite corruption.), has resulted 
in widespread corruption at all levels of the government with an unprecedented scale 
and scope in China’s history.  
 
In this article, we will first assess the current state of corruption in China and 
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CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s new effort to fight it. Based on our assessment 
of the current situation, we will assess how corruption and anticorruption campaigns 
will affect the future of the Chinese political system in general and the Chinese 
military in particular.  
 
CORRUPTION DEFINED 
Since the term “corruption” has been used in a variety of ways to cover a wide 
range of unethical activities, we need to define it for the purpose of this study.  By 
corruption, we mean the sale of government property for personal gains (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1993).  Note that we focus on the corruption of government officials; 
unethical transactions between two private firms, such as kickbacks from a supplier 
to a purchasing manager, are firm governance issues and thus are outside of the 
scope of this study. 
 
A typical example of corruption might be that an official in charge of a 
construction project solicits a bribe from a firm that wants the project, and awards 
it to the firm if the firm pays the bribe. 
 
Corruption takes much needed resources from economic development and 
diverts them into the pockets of corrupt officials. The corrupt officials, fearing being 
caught, hide the money rather than putting it into productive use. Furthermore, 
corrupt officials make policies that are in favor of sectors in which it is easier for 
them to extort payment, such as in real estate or in military procurement, and 
underfund sectors in which it is more difficult to extort bribes such as in elementary 
education, thus distorting resource allocation.  Politically, corruption undermines 
the trust of citizens in public officials and the government (Shleifer and Vishny 
1993).  In sum, corruption slows economic development, poisons the social culture, 
undermines public trust, and weakens the government’s ability to govern (see Judge, 
McNatt et al. (2011) for a review on the studies on corruption). 
 
CORRUPTION WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS:  
“EFFICIENCY-ENHANCING CORRUPTION” 
 
The case of China poses a challenge: corruption is rampant in China, and yet 
the Chinese economy has been growing at a very high speed. This combination 
poses a puzzle we need to address: why does the Chinese economy thrive despite 
corruption? 
 
Research shows that it is because there is a strong and extensive informal social 
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network (called guanxi) in China that makes corruption less inefficient2 compared 
to the corruption in societies without such a network (Li and Wu 2010). In China, 
due to the lack of a fair and efficient system of the rule of law, people rely on their 
private relationships to protect and enforce their interests in social and economic 
exchanges (Li 2009).  These private relationships can efficiently and effectively 
protect the parties to a transaction such as a briber paying a bribee and the latter 
delivering the public goods to the former. These private relationships are well 
developed and form an extensive social network, which reduces the risks of taking 
bribes and thus enables the corrupt official who controls a big public project to go 
beyond taking bribes from their family members or relatives to covertly reach many 
potential bribees (individuals and firms) so that the most efficient bribee who can 
pay the highest bribe will get the project. In other words, in Chinese society in which 
an extensive informal social network exists, public resources (public projects, 
licenses, permits, jobs, etc.) can be awarded to individuals and firms that are 
efficient in economic activities (and that therefore can afford to pay high bribes).  
This arrangement makes corruption less detrimental to economic growth and thus 
explains why China thrives despite corruption.3  
 
This “efficiency-enhancing” corruption not only binds the briber and bribee 
closely together, but also does not necessarily have a direct victim such as an official 
extortion of payment from an individual/firm without something delivered in return, 
which would be a pure dead weight on the economy. These features make exposing 
corruption difficult, as there is no direct victim and the briber has little incentive to 
expose the corrupt official. 
 
A note of caution about “efficiency-enhancing corruption:” it is only less 
inefficient. Compared to no corruption, efficient-enhancing corruption still imposes 
a cost on society and the economy (or “rent-seeking” in economics). Cleaning up 
such corruption will reduce the waste in bribe money and the distortion in resource 
allocation and thus boost economic performance for society. 
 
WHY CHINA CANNOT ERADICATE CORRUPTION  
In order to deter corruption, the Chinese government enacted an anticorruption 
law that punishes corrupt officials quite harshly. For example, the punishment for 
taking a bribe of RMB 100,000 (US$17,000) or more is from ten years to life 
imprisonment plus property confiscation or if the act of corruption is particularly 
serious, the death penalty plus property confiscation (Law of China 2011).  
                                                 
2 Note that we use “less inefficient” instead of “more efficient” to emphasize that corruption 
always causes inefficiency. 
3 A typical case of “predatory corruption” (opposite of “efficiency-enhancing corruption”) 
resulted from the lack of extensive informal social network existed in the Philippines under 
the rule of Ferdinand Marcos from the 1960s to 1980s. 
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Unfortunately, the threat of severe punishment does not effectively clean up 
corruption, as research shows (Shleifer and Vishny 1993); it only increases the 
expected cost of corruption, and the corrupt officials can increase their demand for 
payment to compensate for the increased risk.  
 
Corruption also feeds itself: in order to get promoted, one must pay bribes. Once 
promoted, one must recoup his investment. Corrupt officials protect each other in 
order to protect themselves.  Research shows that as long as the macro environment 
is conducive to corruption, a clean, uncorrupt official will eventually become 
corrupt (Li 2004, Li and Ouyang 2007).  
 
CURRENT CORRUPTION LEVEL IN CHINA 
There is little dispute that corruption in China is widespread, deeply rooted, and 
large in scale, and it occurs in all levels and sections of the government, including 
not only the agencies that control the economic resources, but also the functional 
departments that appear to be far from the economic activities—such as the 
propaganda sector and the education sector.  There is a popular joke in China 
reflecting the social sentiment about the widespread official corruption: “If we 
round up all the officials of the county level4and above, and execute all of them for 
corruption, well, we may kill a few innocent ones. However, if we execute every 
other one, we will certainly miss many guilty ones!” (360doc.com 2011) 
 
Comprehensive and accurate statistics on corruption in China are not available. 
Below are some of the statistics reported by official sources and academic research 
(see Zh.wikipedia.org (2014) for a summary of statistics and sources). 
 
 The total number of officials who were punished for corruption in 
the past 30 years is 4.2 million, of which 660,000 were punished between 
2007 and 2012. Of these 465 were ministry-level officials, and 5 were 
politburo members.  At least 35 convicted officials embezzled more than 
RMB 100 million ($16.7 million) each.     
 China’s Public Security Ministry issued a report in 2004 that at 
least 500 corrupt officials, with a total embezzlement of RMB 70 billion 
($12 billion), fled China and are in hiding.   
 In 2004 the total embezzlement by corrupt officials is estimated 
to be between RMB 409 and RMB 683 billion ($68 to $114 billion).   
                                                 
4 The Chinese official ranks are, from high to low, (1) state level, (2) provincial/ministry 
level, (3) city/bureau level, (4) county/section level. 
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 As of June 2008, 16,000-18,000 corrupt officials have fled China, 
taking with them about RMB 800 billion ($130 billion). 
 The above statistics do not include on-the-job consumption, perks, 
trips, entertainment, official housing, cars, servants, sex services, and 
mistresses.  
 Wen Jiabo, former premier of China, and his family and relatives 
control assets worth at least $2.7 billion (Barboza 2012).  
 Xi Jinping, the General Secretary of the CCP and President of 
China, and his family and relatives have made at least $376 million (RMB 
2.3 billion) investment in various businesses (Zh.wikipedia.org 2014). 
The economic cost of corruption is high for China (even though it is “less 
inefficient”): according to a “conservative” estimate, official corruption cost about 
13.2% to 16.8% of the GDP in the late 1990s (Hu 2001)). If we project from this 
estimate to 2013, the cost of corruption would be about $1.22 –$1.55 trillion yearly 
(based on the 2013 GDP of RMB 56.9 trillion ($9.4 trillion). The political and social 
costs of corruption are huge: it severely undermines the party’s legitimacy and 
destroys public trust and morality.  Perhaps the most damaging effect of corruption 
is the widespread hypocrisy resulting from the high moral standing of the party’s 
ideology against corruption and the draconian laws punishing corruption on the one 
hand and the endemic corruption that has become the norm, on the other.  In many 
cases the corrupt officials were arrested at meetings in which the ones arrested were 
actually giving speeches on battling corruption.  The party leaders who proclaim 
themselves strongly against corruption secretly send their families to the U.S.  One 
mistress of a corrupt official, who was tried for faking her record to get promoted 
and taking bribes, told the court that she was raped by the official first, and then 
forced to become his mistress. He later asked her to fake her record so that he could 
promote her to higher and higher positions so that she could extort more and more 
bribes.  “Yes, I have a low moral standard. But compared to that official who gives 
eloquent speeches on battling corruption by the day and screws me and extorts 
money by the night, I am much more decent” (baidu.com 2014).  A popular saying 
about the fact that the people in China are forced to be hypocritical regarding 
corruption in China is “a shameful thing is that we all know the truth, and the 
government still lies. A more shameful thing than that is that the government knows 
we know the truth, and it still lies. An even more shameful thing than that is that the 
government knows we know it lies and it still lies” (epochtimes.com 2013).  Jorge 
Guajardo, former Mexican Ambassador to China, commented that the Chinese 
regime is so reliant on corruption, that the anticorruption movement launched by 
President Xi is virtually useless. He said that he would tell Xi to stop the 
anticorruption campaign and to “get used to it, and own up to it” (Fish 2014).  
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ASSESSING XI’S NEW ANTICORRUPTION EFFORT 
After Xi Jinping assumed power in the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, 
he waged a new war on corruption. Xi seems to be very determined and said that 
“the corruption is getting worse and worse and will ultimately destroy the party and 
the state.”  Ordinary Chinese and policy analysts, as well as corrupt Chinese officials 
all take his intentions seriously.  In less than two years since the 18th Party Congress, 
48 officials at the rank of the province/ministry level or higher have been 
investigated for corruption, almost five times the average over the past 25 years 
(SinovisionNet 2014).  The case that has shocked the world was Xi’s investigation 
of Zhou Yongkang, the former state security czar and a retired politburo standing 
member, which had, until his fall, been viewed as having immunity from any 
criminal investigations.  Political commentaries that “Xi’s anticorruption campaign 
is for real” are all over the press in China and outside. If there are any real effects of 
his campaign, it would be the corrupt officials who sensed it first: they are rushing 
to unload their ill-gotten million-dollar apartments, stocks, and luxury cars. Some 
corrupt officials who used to hold up the approval of projects in order to extort 
bribery now suddenly approve projects quickly without asking for anything 
(eNewsTree.com 2014).   
 
What are Xi’s intentions in this anticorruption campaign, which seems to be for 
real and has reached as high as former politburo standing members? Based on the 
information we gathered from public sources and private interviews, we believe that 
Xi has the following objectives: 
 
First, unlike his predecessor Hu Jintao, Xi is confident and is convinced that he 
can save the party by eradicating corruption. He wants a clean party that will be able 
to rule forever and a market economy under the party’s absolute control. In this 
sense, his campaign is for real based on his confidence and conviction. However, 
his concerns are hypocritical in the sense that he is fully aware that corruption is 
inevitable under one-party rule and he thus must allow and tolerate reasonable 
corruption. But obviously the current level of corruption is not reasonable. One 
interviewee, C, who is close to Xi, thinks that Xi is fed up with the “party elders”—
the retired politburo standing members—who regard themselves above the law and 
control the most lucrative industries in China.  They would enter any industries they 
deem profitable, and have as many mistresses as they like, and destroy anyone in 
their way with any means. They literally get away with murder. These greedy and 
shameless acts by the party elders disgust Xi, who, according to C, “has the highest 
integrity among the party leaders”.  Of course, this does not mean Xi is beyond 
corruption. As we mentioned earlier, Xi’s extended family is very wealthy and 
controlled vast business interests until Xi reportedly recently ordered them to divest. 
But Xi and his family and relatives are not excessive and over-greedy. Their take is 
commensurate to their rank in the party hierarchy.  
 
The Chinese Communist Party is like a mafia organization, which has unwritten 
but unequivocal rules about who should get what and how much.  If the number two 
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in the party has grabbed noticeably more than the number one, the number two has 
committed a serious offence and needs to be punished. In a mafia organization, the 
hierarchy must be observed and protected at any cost. Promotions are made through 
secret negotiations, not by public campaigns. Bo Xilai violated this rule by 
publically challenging the big bosses and campaigning. Bo was a politburo member 
and a rising star in the party before his fall. He was sentenced for embezzling RMB 
20 million ($3.3 million), which was widely viewed in China as “peanuts” for his 
rank, which implies that his real crime is not corruption, but challenging the top. “A 
low-ranking county head would easily take more than what Bo took” is a common 
view among ordinary Chinese (dwnews.com 2013). 
 
Second, Xi’s anticorruption campaign is a political move that will earn him 
political capital with the ordinary people. Waging an anticorruption campaign is the 
most popular thing to do in order to increase his popularity among the ordinary 
people, who are very angry at the corrupt officials.  
 
Third, the campaign is a convenient way for Xi to get rid of his political 
enemies.  Xi’s anticorruption campaign is a political movement, not a legal action.  
He and his lieutenant Wang Qishan determine who to investigate, and the decision 
process is secretive. Do they treat their friends and allies the same as they treat their 
political rivals (such as Bo Xilai) and other people they do not like? It is very 
unlikely. Xi and Wang claim that there is no limit to how high their investigation 
can go, implying that they can investigate the former heads of state, such as Jiang 
Zemin, Li Peng, and Wen Jiabao, who are widely viewed as greedy and corrupt, or 
at least as corrupt as Zhou Yongkang. But so far there is no sign that Xi and Wang 
will go after them. This makes people believe that their campaign is a selective 
enforcement of personal vendettas. Some commentaries point out that there are no 
officials of “second generations red” (princelings) being investigated or arrested for 
corruption (World News Net 2014). Some argue that Xi is more worried about 
cliques within the party than corruption (Chu 2015).  
 
Is Xi’s effort effective? One quotation from an official article comments on the 
effectiveness of fighting corruption: 
  
“The CCP has set up a series of codes and regulations to rid itself of 
corruption…The current campaign to battle corruption and build a clean 
government has achieved prominent results…the force of the campaign is 
increasing with great pace… 
 
“Surveys show that people’s satisfaction with the effectiveness of battling 
corruption and building a clean government has been steadily increased from 
5.9% to 70.6%; the public that believes corruption has been curbed increased 
from 68.1% to 83.8%.”  
 
While the above quotations seem to fit Xi’s new campaign, they are not about 
his campaign, unfortunately. They are quotes from an anticorruption report 
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published in 2010, two years before Xi came to power (the source of the above 
quotations is baike.com (2010)).  Every time the party wages a campaign, it is 
always the best yet and the most effective, according to the party’s own assessment.  
If by 2010, according to the above official report, the campaign was so successful 
and corruption was effectively cleaned, and the people were satisfied, why does Xi 
need to make another “unprecedented” campaign merely two years later? Evidence 
shows that the CCP’s anticorruption campaigns usually lose their effectiveness after 
about 18 months or so (Shambaugh 2014), so we should not overestimate the 
effectiveness of his campaign. 
 
So what is new in terms of legal development for fighting corruption?  Based 
on the actions of Xi’s anticorruption campaign (Zhang 2013), I evaluate the 
effectiveness of each action in terms of achieving its goals and in building new legal 
institutions to curb corruption (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1, President Xi’s Anticorruption Campaign Actions and Their 
Effectiveness 
 
Actions Effectiveness in 





Investigating big tigers to 
have a shock and awe 
effect 
5, very effective. 0, no new institution 
building 
Swapping flies5 (small 
cases) 
3, effective (the central 
government is swamped 
by too many cases and the 
problem of selective 
prosecution) 
0, no new institution 
building 
Attacking the root-cause 
of corruption 
0, not effective 0, no new institution 
building  
Reforming the 
investigation function of 
the party 
1, minimally effective (set 
up a website, increased 
departments within the 
party anticorruption 
organ, no legal reforms) 




4, effective (sent teams 
from the central 
government to localities) 
0, no new institution 
building 
Self-cleaning of the top 
leaders 
0 (reducing meetings, 
ceremonies, banquets, 
etc.) 
0, no new institution 
building 
                                                 
5 Xi claims that his campaign will hunt both “tigers” (high-level corrupt officials) and 
“flies” (low-level corrupt officials). 
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Coordinating the party 
anticorruption effort with 
the legal system 
1, the campaign is a party 
effort; the use of law is 
nominal. 
0, no new institution 
building 
Strengthening auditing 3, the campaign is a party 
effort; auditing is a party 
tool   
0, no new institution 
building 
Publishing the 
government budget and 
reducing government 
expenditure 
2, somewhat effective, it 
has more propaganda 
value than substance. 
0, no new institution 
building 
Establishing surveillance 
on money laundering 
2, it can be a deterrence 
and useful tool. 
2, it is a new 
institution 
Cooperating with other 
countries 
3, it is useful (endorsed 
UN anticorruption 
agreement) 
2, it is a new 
institution 
Attacking both the 
symptoms and the causes 
of corruption 
1, it is only effective with 
the symptoms, not the 
causes.  
0, no new institution 
building 
 
Sources: (Zhang 2013) and author. 
 
Of the actions in Table 1, how many have helped to build new anticorruption 
institutions? The answer is, unfortunately, few. In fact the current campaign has 
little to do with building a legal system to fight corruption, as the campaign is a 
CCP-led political campaign. 
 
An important aspect of the institutional building is to systematically eradicate 
the root-cause of corruption, which is the monopoly of power of the CCP and the 
controlling role of the CCP in all sectors of China, especially in the economy.  
Greedy officials gobbling up huge amounts of bribes is only a symptom of 
corruption, which has its root-cause in the institutionalization of the discretionary 
power of government officials in controlling and distributing political, economic, 
and social resources in China.  Thus to cure corruption, arresting and even executing 
corrupt officials is only alleviating the symptoms at best; it does not root out the 
main causes. This argument is not new even among the party leaders in China. Xi, 
Wang, and their colleagues are fully aware of the need to attack the root-causes in 
order to clean up the corruption. The question is: can they do it? 
 
Wang Qishan, the anticorruption czar, said that to eradicate corruption, they 
need to attack both the symptoms and the root-causes. However, he admitted that 
right now the focus is to attack the symptoms in order to buy time so that they can 
address the root-causes later (Sohu.com 2014).  Whether this is a genuine promise 
or an excuse for not addressing the more fundamental issues, one thing is certain: to 
uproot the causes of corruption means to rid the country of one-party monopoly, 
which is not the intention of the party leaders.  
 
《當代中國研究》                                                                     2017年第24卷第2期 
150 
 
Another reason that anticorruption will face strong resistance is the dilemma 
that the central government seeks stability and longevity, but the local governments 
must have income and need to extort as much rent as possible, for example, the 
aggressive land grab from farmers and city residents for new development by local 
governments. So even if Xi truly wants to clean corruption, the local governments 
will continue to need to seek rents and thus maintain their engagement in corruption.  
 
The “shock and awe” style anticorruption campaign has instilled fear into all 
officials and at the same time demoralized them. “The investigators are 
overzealous,” commented one of the officials I interviewed, “I am fearful. God 
knows when and for what reason they will arrest me.” As a result, morale is low, 
and resistance is prevalent among government officials, reports say. One 
interviewee commented that “in order to get an approval for your project from a low 
ranking but yet powerful bureaucrat whose salary is low, you have to pay some 
money to incentivize him. Now we can’t and won’t pay him and nothing gets 
approved.”  Even the anticorruption czar Wang Qishan admitted that this has been 
a major side-effect of the anticorruption campaign (Chinanews 2014).  
 
According to interviewee L, who frequently travels to China and interacts with 
officials in China, there is a sense of panic and fear that something catastrophic is 
going to happen caused by Xi’s on-going anticorruption campaign. The reason is 
that all officials are corrupt in various degrees. If Xi’s anticorruption campaign does 
not stop, then a large number of cadres, if not all of them, will be prosecuted, thus 
paralyzing the government. 
 
OUTLOOK ON CORRUPTION IN CHINA 
What will happen to Xi’s campaign and corruption in China?  
 
Xi’s anticorruption campaign will bring down a large number of high-level 
officials who stand out in corruption. These officials exhibit more greed than their 
peers and have grabbed substantially more than the unwritten rules allow for their 
ranks, and they are thus hated by the masses and even their peers.  To bring them 
down is justified in Xi’s eyes and enables him to earn political capital and popular 
support.   
 
However, carrying on the anticorruption campaign as Xi and Wang promise 
that “there is no limit as far as investigating corruption is concerned” will ultimately 
destroy the party and paralyze the government.  Thus this anticorruption campaign, 
while being carried out on a broader scale and reaching higher levels in the 
hierarchy, will be only temporary in effect. It can only clean up some of the most 
egregious corruption and thus reduce corruption for a short period of time. The 
system (the party) is similar to an obese person who has made a new-year resolution 
to exercise but does not curb his access to and appetite for junk food. The newly 
intensified exercise will help him to shed some pounds, but his ability to grab food, 
and the unabated appetite for it will ensure that he regains his weight.  As long as 
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the CCP monopolizes the ruling of China, the unbalanced and unchecked power of 
the officials will enable them to find new ways to benefit themselves. Corruption 
will be a constant feature in China. When the corruption level is so high that it causes 
the masses to complain, the party will prosecute a few to make the masses feel better.  
 
Can the bottom-up strategy of anticorruption be effective? The bottom-up 
strategy—mobilizing grass-root people to report corruption— is a double-edged 
sword.  It may help the CCP to expose corruption, but it can also upset the party’s 
rule by disseminating information and encouraging mass participation.  
“Whistleblowing is anonymous and dangerous,” one of the interviewed officials 
commented. “My fear is that my work unit is mentioned on the internet,” a head of 
a government agency in Beijing told the author. While the internet is useful to the 
CCP for waging cyber-attacks and engaging in espionage work, in principle the CCP 
fears the internet, because the most salient features of the internet—open, free 
information, and decentralization—are opposite to the need of a totalitarian 
regime—closed, secretive, and centralized (Li 2009).  The CCP controls the internet 
as tightly as it can with all its resources and also harshly prosecutes any ordinary 
people who publicly call for the establishment of the rule of law to fight corruption. 
Anticorruption is a privilege of the party, not the right of ordinary people 
(zh.wikipedia.org 2014). 
 
The fact that Xi and Wang can arrest Zhou Yongkang—the most powerful 
secret police boss—demonstrates that the party hierarchy and its governance are 
strong and effective. Whoever is the head of the party has absolute and effective 
control over the party, including the secret police which everyone fears. To the best 
of our knowledge, there have not been any assassinations related to anticorruption 
and no violent incidents of resistance to arrest so far. However, we have no way of 
knowing this because of the CCP’s control of the media.  Regardless, we should not 
expect the party to disintegrate any time soon due to corruption practices or 
anticorruption efforts. 
 
Projecting beyond Xi’s anticorruption campaign, what is the likelihood that 
China will substantially eradicate corruption? To answer this question, we can 
examine the institutional requirements needed to effectively and efficiently curb 
corruption, and the likelihood that China will substantially develop them in the next 
fifteen years or so. Based on research and experience (Shleifer and Vishny 1993, 
Tanzi 1998, Li 2004, Transparency International 2014), the following institutional 
developments (which may be closely related and overlapping) are needed to reduce 
corruption. 
 
1. A political system that ensures fair and effective political competition.  The 
pressure from opposition parties is an effective way to keep the ruling party more 
honest and less corrupt. It is highly unlikely that viable opposition parties will 
emerge in China in the near future. 
 
2. A limited government. Reducing the authoritative and discretionary power of 
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the government and the ownership of the government in the economy will mitigate 
corruption. The Chinese government has made some effort in reducing the licenses 
and approvals needed to pursue economic activities. However it still owns and 
controls vast assets in the most lucrative industries such as the energy, telecom, 
aviation, transportation, and banking industries. It is possible that the Chinese 
government will further reduce its ownership and control in the economy. 
 
3. Rule of law. To effectively and fairly fight corruption, China must have a 
judiciary system that is independent of the CCP and the executive branch, and a 
police force that follows the orders of the judiciary system instead of the CCP.  In 
countries with strong rule of law, it is the police, not the ruling political party, that 
initiates and carries out a corruption investigation. This is highly unlikely to happen 
in the near future in China (because it conflicts with the CCP’s monopoly of power). 
 
4. Free and competitive media. Free press is proven to be a highly effective way 
to expose and fight corruption.  The CCP views the free press as a major threat to 
its political monopoly and it has no tolerance for the press to freely investigate and 
report corruption.   
 
5. Development of the civil society (political participation of citizens). The 
participation of ordinary people in battling corruption is necessary to change the 
corrupt culture, develop social trust, and make the government accountable.  The 
CCP is very cautious in allowing grass-root efforts by ordinary people in fighting 
corruption, since it may threaten the party’s political monopoly.  
 
6. An adequately paid work force in the government.  The experience of Hong 
Kong and Singapore in eradicating corruption is to raise the salary level of 
government employees close to the market level to reduce their incentive to ask for 
bribes (Li 2004).  However, the idea of raising the salary level of government 
employees to curb corruption is heavily criticized by the ordinary people in China, 
who have little trust in the officials and argue that they will not reduce bribe-taking 
even if their salary is raised (Zhiqiu 2004).  In contrary, as part of his anticorruption 
campaign, Xi is lowering the salary level of the top managers of the state-owned 
enterprises, which may increase the incentive of these managers to corrupt (Li 
2014).  The formal salary of the Chinese government employees is low and had not 
been increased since 2006 until early 2015. Even after the 2015 increase, the lowest 
level government workers earn RMB 1,320 (US$ 213) and the highest level officials 
such as Xi make RMB 11,385 (US$ 1,830), which is not enough to rent a decent 
apartment in Beijing (Forsythe 2015). Of course, no one believes that Xi can support 
his living and future retirement expenditure based on this salary.  It is an open secret 
that senior party leaders receive huge amount of funds and in-kind resources on the 
job and in retirement.  According to the 2004 official data, the average funds 
received by each retired standing member of the politburo for one year is RBM 27 
million (US$ 4.4 million), not counting the free transportation, chartered flights and 
the free use of vacation homes and best medical services they enjoy (Zhou 2011). 
To put it simply, the fact that Xi’s formal salary is so low implies that corruption is 
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built in the human resource system of the Chinese Communist Party, and therefore 
cannot be eradicated. 
 
Of the six requirements, only the second one (limited government) has a higher 
likelihood of some substantial development in China. Therefore, in the absence of 
any substantial institutional development in most of the above requirements, the 
CCP’s anticorruption campaign will inevitably remain an extralegal, CCP-led 
political movement and thus unwinnable.  In the meantime, in order to carry out his 
campaign, Xi must exert absolute authority and silence any criticism towards him 
or the CCP. So the outcome of Xi’s campaign is the establishment of his dictatorial 
power within the party that forces all party officials to demonstrate loyalty to him, 
a tightly controlled media, and the imprisonment of party critics and dissidents in 
large numbers.  This closely resembles a Mao-style totalitarian rule that depends on 
constant political cleansings and mass movements, but with a fatal twist: China is 
no longer in the ultra-leftist era under Mao and has embraced the market economy, 
which, in order to flourish, requires personal freedom and government’s 
relinquishing its total control over the society and the economy. The incompatibility 
between Xi’s concentration of power and arbitrary and select arrests on the one 
hand, and the need for further liberalization and better rule of law on the other is the 
most serious challenges facing X’s anticorruption campaign, as the anticorruption 
campaign and the crackdown on dissidents undermine the already weak and 
deficient legal system, which must be improved for China to become a civil and 
developed society.            
 
CONCLUSION:  
STAGNATION IN THE AUTHORITARIAN TRAP   
In conclusion, we believe that Xi’s anticorruption campaign has had a strong 
“shock and awe” effect and has brought down many corrupt officials. However, due 
to the absence of the institutional building of the legal system, the campaign relies 
on KGB-style secret investigations and arrests that all end in show trials and 
convictions in court. In the meantime, Xi has consolidated his power and promoted 
a new generation of officials loyal to him. Unfortunately, as the anticorruption 
campaign will fade away and the newly promoted officials learn how to (ab)use 
their power, there is no reason to believe that this new generation of party elites will 
stay clean and not grab.  And then the cycle repeats itself: a new anticorruption 
campaign must be waged, which may act like giving drugs to the ordinary Chinese 
people to temporarily alleviate the pain afflicted by corrupt officials.   
 
For the government, an outcome of the anticorruption campaign will be the 
establishment of more rigid policies and regulations to reduce the opportunities for 
officials to grab. These new rules, which are based on the lack of trust by the CCP 
on its own officials, will demoralize government employees and reduce the 
operational efficiency of the government. A more adverse effect of these new rules 
is that government officials will soon circumvent or even find ways to profit from 
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them. The fact that most party officials pretend to be role models in public and extort 
bribes in secret has made the CCP the party of hypocrites.  
 
But the hypocrisy does not stop at the party, it infects the whole society; the 
discrepancy between the CCP’s moral high ground and the excessive greed and 
immoral behavior of the exposed party officials has forced the Chinese people to be 
hypocritical as well. It is a common knowledge of the people that corruption is a 
result of the monopoly of power by the CCP and thus cannot be eradicated by the 
party itself. However, the common people still enjoy the moment whenever the party 
brings down a “big tiger.” This contradiction has formed the twisted national culture 
that on the one hand hates the CCP’s rule and blames it for everything and on the 
other hand praises and relies on the party for everything people have. With time, 
this mentality will help dampen the strong nationalism in today’s China, which is a 
result of the recent economic achievement in China. However, as China’s economy 
slows down and the surge of patriotic feeling gets tired and fades, the ordinary 
people will become more critical towards the party due to continued corruption. 
 
In sum, projecting from the current trends assuming that the CCP will still be 
in power (which has a very high likelihood since the party has no intention to 
relinquish power and independent forces are extremely weak to challenge it), we see 
that China will enter into an “authoritarian trap,” by which we mean the unique 
situation in which a communist state initiates the economic reform but refuses to 
democratize. The authoritarian power enables the state to effectively carry out the 
economic reform and achieve economic growth, while suppressing the demand for 
the rule of law and democratization, resulting in rampant corruption that hurts 
further economic development and threatens the authoritarian rule. However, 
eradicating corruption in the absence of the rule of law risks returning to Mao’s 
communism, which is not in the best interest of the authoritarian state either. 
Trapped in this dilemma, China will likely experience stagnation in both economic 
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